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THE UNMANLY FEAR:  
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Abstract 
This essay concerns the history of extortion in American law and culture, highlighting the 
shift from extortion as a paradigmatically male enterprise to one inseparably associated with 
women. Before the nineteenth-century, extortion was figured as an assault on a victim’s 
consent. Since men monopolized consent, extortion unfolded as a contest between legal 
subjects over political manhood. After the mid-nineteenth-century, a new class of 
‘respectable’ victims, openly terrified by women’s threats, made unprecedented claims for 
legal protection. In response, well-placed courts wrote consent out of the equation, 
broadening the scope of extortionous threats to unleash the familiar fin-de-siècle tide of sex 
scandal.  
 
Keywords: extortion and law relating to, blackmail, sexual blackmail, gendered power, 
consent and coercion 
 
Introduction 
Before the middle of the nineteenth century, women were completely absent from American 
legal stories of extortion.2 This does not mean that no woman threatened to accuse a man of 
some crime unless compensated, or that no man tried to gain advantage by threatening to 
expose some woman’s secrets. There surely were. But in law and culture, extortion had 
been a legal relationship intimately, even constitutively, about men. In the decade after the 
end of the American Civil War, however, men in some of the most self-consciously 
‘respectable’ circles began to hear warnings that ‘the blackmailer, though sometimes a man, 
is usually a woman.’3 Historians have noted the development, seeing in this moment the 
crystallization of what Lawrence Friedman calls the ‘(pure) blackmail’ of sexual scandal.4 
Yet, as paradigmatic as the sexualized extortion scene might seem to observers today, the 
exact nature of the extortionous exchange was not nearly so clear to contemporaries. Since 
the seventeenth-century, in fact, jurists and commentators wrestled with the non-violent 
threat so heinous as to compel a victim to pay money for protection - an exchange not self-
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evidently criminal, yet one that victims insisted felt just like an actual act of violence. Thus 
the historical and legal problem of extortion: identifying that threat that ‘constitute[s] the 
equivalence of actual violence,’ overwhelming the free consent of the victim and forcing the 
seemingly willing exchange of cash for security that made a mockery of men’s monopoly on 
the legal power of full consent.5 And in this light, the sudden appearance of women in 
nineteenth century stories of extortion reveals something more than the birth of the ‘pure’ 
essence of a crime that had existed for centuries. It reveals a challenge to the gendered 
grammar of consent, coercion, and manhood that animated extortion as such a persistent 
and powerful feature of the Anglo-American legal tradition. This article will trace some of 
these contesting claims for legal recognition, not only to take a wider look at the history of a 
fascinating crime, but to illuminate the underlying cultural and legal struggles over the uses 
of consent and the nature of coercion that both sustained and transformed the meanings of 
extortion in the American legal imagination.  
 
The subject of extortion has received a lot of scholarly attention in the past few years. 
Lawrence Friedman and Angus McLaren, most importantly, have carefully examined the 
appearance of the sex scandal as a matter of legal concern in late nineteenth century 
America, and both have arrived at a basic, fairly indisputable calculus: ‘as middle-class 
notions of sexual respectability emerged,’ McLaren tells us, ‘so in tandem did sexual 
blackmail.’6 The logic of his claim is strong. This well-researched yet still hard-to-define 
‘middle class’ has long been associated with their self-consciously ‘respectable’ celebration 
of a sentimentally-domesticated familial intimacy, an aggressive counterpoint to a larger 
American political landscape strung-out in tension between the wealth of property rights and 
the numbers of democracy.7 So it would not surprise if an ambitious class might seek to 
criminalize those accusations of sexual impropriety that would undermine their justification 
for political relevance. True enough, both Friedman and McLaren apply the term ‘blackmail’ 
to a whole range of examples where contemporaries never mentioned the word, they frame 
a distinction between the presumably sexual category of blackmail and more mundane 
extortion that did not exist in law or ordinary usage, they do not emphasize the fact that the 
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term ‘blackmail’ was not really a legal term, and they fail to mention that well into the 
twentieth century ‘blackmail’ most commonly denoted police corruption and not some 
essential connection to sexuality.8 But this is all beside the point. Their work is about 
unearthing the origins of categories that we know perfectly well in our own modern, intimacy-
obsessed culture. This essay, on the other hand, is rooted in the past, situating the late 
nineteenth century contests over the meanings of extortion within their own overlapping 
cultural, legal, and institutional contexts, first by taking seriously earlier regimes of extortion 
as ‘purely’ terrifying in the hearts of contemporaries themselves, and then by examining in 
more detail the disruptive efforts of a rising class of men whose fears of women helped to 
reshape the institutional organization of unmanning terror in their own cultural image. 
Ultimately, however, this discussion hopes to do more than contextualize. It will illuminate 
the ways that cultural struggle destabilized the republican epistemology of extortion, and in 
the process, framed a new regime of extortionous intimacy that seems to many so natural 
and uncontested in the first place.  
 
1 Extortion and Extortionists 
The reason why it has been difficult for recent scholars to capture the meaning of extortion 
beyond its ‘modern sense’ is that extortion was not essentially about sex, or really about any 
specific kind of threat. Extortion was, rather, a crime of fear rooted in the production of a 
‘terror of the mind’ so profound as to act as the ‘equivalence of actual violence’ and compel 
the payment of money in exchange for emotional relief. In this light, extortion signalled more 
than a taking of mere possessions. It was an attack on self-possession, and in an emerging 
constitutional landscape where only men possessed the legal privileges of self-possession, 
the loss of consent undermined all the revolutionary possibilities of ‘independent manhood’ 
itself. Through ‘fear, that abject and unmanly passion,’ extortion worked a strange sort of 
alchemy, transfiguring the practical measure of legal independence - the free contractual 
agreement -into its very obverse, what one American termed ‘internal oppression.’9 Certainly 
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one eighteenth century extortionist revealed his awareness of this perverse transmutation of 
consent into willing subjection when he confided to his victim (whom he threatened to 
accuse of murder): ‘It is my aim,’ wrote a man named Felton, ‘to make it your inclination to 
serve me.’10 True enough, courts and constituencies could hardly agree upon the precise 
nature of a fear powerful enough to ‘overcome the senses of a firm and prudent man’ and 
make subjection the victim’s inclination; in fact, that persistent contestedness is one of the 
themes of the present essay.11 Yet extortion’s gendered calculus of fear and consent 
resonated powerfully in an age of men’s republican liberation. For if consent defined the 
possibilities of a liberated manhood, then ‘Fear,’ read an early examination of republican 
government, ‘is the principle of despotism.’12 
 
The term ‘extortion’ appears in statutes as early as the late fourteenth century, though the 
acts considered extortionous were criminalized a century earlier. Its primordial purpose was 
to prevent local officials from using their position to extract excess fees ‘under color of office’ 
(‘sub coloreofficii’.)13 The early development of the law was a matter of intense practical 
concern; before 1275 Edward I authorized a series of special inquests to expose widespread 
corruption by aggressive sheriffs and other local officers. The First Statute of Westminster 
tackled these problems by specifically prohibiting the receipt of any excessive fees, a move 
that strengthened the administrative power of the sovereign as it provided very real 
protections for the ordinary people who so often found themselves at the mercy of local 
authorities.14 To be sure, as the modern scholar James Lindgren tells us, not all cases of 
what would be called ‘extortion’ were forceful.15 The law grew out of a prohibition on excess 
fees, and there were a number of early cases of bribery or fraud mixed-in with the more 
familiar docket of false imprisonments or threatened accusations. Similarly, later statutes 
also included frauds perpetrated ‘by the subtile and untrue demeanour of sheriffs 
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undersherifs shire clerks,’ declaring their acts of trickery a ‘greate extortion.’16 Nevertheless, 
before the eighteenth century, it was the predatory and engrossing sheriff - or the ferryman, 
or the tavern-keeper, or potentially any holder of a license or monopoly - who dominated 
legal proceedings.17At the most immediate level, then, early extortion did double-duty for a 
consolidating central state: it contained the corruption of local authorities while, at the same, 
it deployed state power to protect the king’s subjects from an irresistible abuse. 18 
 
From the perspective of the administrative state, extortion appears as a threat to the system, 
a simple prohibition on excessive fees to prevent local officers selling public justice for their 
own private gain. Victims, however, probably knew official extortion in considerably more 
personal, considerably more emotional, terms. Certainly this was the case for many 
American men of the eighteenth century. Drawing from an Anglo-American political 
vocabulary that had begun coalescing in the seventeenth century (historians call this a 
‘Commonwealth tradition’), many free American men expressed an acute sensitivity to men’s 
political rights and of their equal treatment before the law.19 Almost reflexively defensive, the 
call ‘to either manfully oppose the injuries We endure…or submissively submit to the 
degrading terms those haughty Despots choose to impose,’ animated an intensely personal 
resistance all through the American revolutionary epoch.20 The fear of humiliating 
submission to local officials was palpable, the ‘dreadful fear of the extortion of excessive 
fees’ hanging like a pall over the head of helpless men, eliciting not anger or hurt or even 
loss, but the ‘dread’ that dictionaries of the day identified with the perfect subjection of ‘awe, 
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fear, terrour.’21 Later writers agreed. The ‘extortion of sheriffs,’ another possible victim 
exclaimed, always overcame any wilful resistance, ‘oppressing [victims] to conform’ to the 
seemingly irresistible demands of local ‘public servants.’22 This inner debasement 
undermined all pretension of reasoned consent, the independent will of free men laid low in 
‘the humiliating state of submitting to the extortion of official fees without any remedy.’23 The 
power of this humiliating subjection, though not spelled out in statute, seemed clear to 
contemporary English jurists too, who reasoned that the mainspring of the injury was in the 
‘vehement terror of mind’ by which ‘the free agency of the party is destroyed.’24 Indeed,so 
basic was this political calculus of fear and consent that American provincial legislatures 
expressed a considerable preoccupation with the crime, not only ubiquitously enacting 
extortion statutes early in the eighteenth century, but immediately reiterating them after 
1776, as the newly independent states constructed republican constitutions out of ‘the 
consent of the governed.’25 Extortion was a pressing concern because it destroyed the 
manly use of independent consent that defined the highest possibilities of the revolutionary 
republic.  
 
It should not surprise that courts and legislatures understood extortion in terms of the 
relationship between men and government. This, in a way, is their very native language. Yet 
other communities, with other concerns, freely employed the cultural resonance of extortion 
to describe their own particular anxieties of fear and loss. The social anxieties of American 
Protestant separatists bear out the creative possibilities embedded in the terrifying violation 
of extortion.26 In this community, however, the terror was not incited by the ‘tyranny of 
excessive fees,’ though fees were closely regulated. It was the horror of high prices that cut 
to the heart of the covenanted community. Following the Old Testament admonitions of the 
prophet Ezekiel, who warned the proud denizens of Jerusalem that ‘Thou has greedily 
gained of thy neighbours by extortion, and hast forgotten [God],’ Puritans in Massachusetts 
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Bay constructed a comprehensive system of economic regulations to maintain the cultural 
cohesion of a utopian regime where ‘love and affection are reciprocal in a most equal and 
sweet kind of commerce.’27 The earliest Provincial law codes made clear that the act of 
selling too high constituted the very legal definitions of ‘oppression’ and ‘extortion.’28 The 
reason for this care, insisted the famous Puritan Cotton Mather, was that high prices 
constituted an unparalleled assault on the most basic commitments of Christian neighbours 
and theocratic rule, both self and society collapsing as erstwhile neighbours ‘screw[ed] upon 
one another’ (and it would be good to remember here that the screw was a favourite 
instrument of torture) in the chaos of ‘Oppression and Extortion.’29 This social and spiritual 
anxiety only metastasized in the crisis of revolutionary war. One minister, Jonathan French 
from Massachusetts, practically writhed in anguish at the thought of sellers taking advantage 
of the weakness of neighbours; seeing the distress of his community weighed heavy with the 
burdens of the Revolutionary War, it seemed clear, in his Practical Discourse Against 
Extortion, that the cruelty of extortion lay in the bargain struck under duress, inciting a 
palpable pain in the covenanted body politic, ‘knawing out the bowels under the mask of a 
friend.’30 Even the harsh oppression of arms appeared preferable to the extortionous 
bargains of supposed friends; ‘Who is worse,’ asks one anonymous pamphleteer during the 
upheaval of Revolution, ‘Extortioners or Tories?’’ - one attacks openly while his own 
countrymen ‘act…in secret, and kill…ten to one.’31 The pain was excruciating within the 
community of saints. True enough, by the later eighteenth century all this talk about price 
extortion might have seemed something of an anachronism as price regulation gave way to 
the responsiveness of contract. And with culture of loving commerce waning, the crime of 
‘oppression’ did not make it into the nineteenth century.     
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2 Constructive Violence: Sexual Blackmail  
As both a cultural and legal institution, extortion was a powerfully flexible institution. Whether 
in the society of the saints, founded in collective submission to the will of God and 
undermined by the selfish aggrandizing of personal wealth, or in the body of citizens, tied 
together by law as free and equal men and dissolved by the tyranny of official oppression, 
we see the peculiar shape of irrepressible fear written in the cultural self-consciousness of 
highly organized political communities. Scholars, however, have largely ignored these 
historical possibilities in their archaeologies of the crime. Instead, historians have tended to 
focus on a small number of late eighteenth century cases, concerning accusations of men’s 
‘sodomitical’ actions, as the primordial seed from which ‘(pure) blackmail’ emerged.32 And, 
indeed, as 1784’s Hickman’s Case found, the special terror of a ‘threat to accuse of the 
greatest of all crimes’ - and this was the telling colloquialism contemporaries used to signify 
sex between men - constituted ‘the equivalent of actual violence,’ an accusation provoking a 
fear ‘equally, if not more terrific than the dread of personal injury.’33 Here appears a state of 
affairs recognizably modern, grounded in sexuality as the essence of human experience and 
of individual identity. No wonder the moment has received attention. For this is where 
historian Lawrence Friedman insists, ‘Sexual blackmail [emerges] as the historic heart of the 
crime.’34 
 
Modern commentators have regularly insisted that it was the humiliating nature of the sexual 
accusation itself that robbed the victim of the capacity to resist. Yet it was not simply the 
social disapprobation of sexual exposure that was so fearful here. What made such 
accusations terrifying, judges made clear, was that accusations of sodomitical practice could 
be, quite literally, a matter of life and death. In a social and legal order where sex created 
legal relations of domination and subordination, sex between formally equal men was such a 
profound threat to the stability of the institutional order that it not only constituted a capital 
offence (all crimes designated felonies were once punishable by death), but ‘the greatest of 
all crimes,’ a profound assault on society as a whole. In this light, an accusation of sodomy 
was not simply a private matter, or even a social one. Sodomy was a crime against the 
people, and its prohibition contained all the potentiality of official violence. In Donnelly’s 
Case of 1779, for example, the terror of accusation did not lie solely in the accusation itself - 
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again, there were very familiar legal tools available to recover for an injury to reputation.35 
Rather, the status of sodomy as a ‘crime of infamous punishment’ made the accusation ‘a 
threat of personal violence, for the [victim] had everything to fear from being dragged 
through the streets as a culprit charged with an unnatural crime.’36Without the fear of the 
state’s power to legally deprive persons of their life, liberty, and property, the accusation 
appeared in a completely different light to English courts. Take the forgotten 1770s example 
of a man of ‘unblemished reputation’ threatened by one James Reane with a public 
accusation of ‘taking indecent liberties at [a London] park.’ The victim, in response, colluded 
with the local constabulary to capture Reane.37 Though no one doubted the fact of the threat, 
the panel of judges nevertheless established that there was no legitimate fear of punishment 
or real loss, despite the embarrassing rumours that surely would follow accusation. Thus it 
followed that ‘in this case there was no violence,’ opined the judges, ‘either real or 
constructive.’ The crime, then, was in the fear. But it was not fear of sexual defamation. It 
was fear of official violence, in English courts, that constituted extortion’s peculiar 
‘constructive violence.’  
 
These sodomy cases thus constituted, legal writers would insist in the nineteenth century, 
and as no historian has since revealed, a species of oppression under colour of office.38 To 
American courts and legislatures, increasingly, all men could participate in extortion, or at 
least as long as their relationship was inflected with the possibility of official violence. As 
early as New Jersey’s 1796 Act criminalizing ‘threat[s] to accuse any person of a crime of an 
indictable nature by the laws of this State, with intent to extort him or her of any money, 
wares, merchandise, goods or chattels,’ some state legislatures were open to reorienting 
extortion as a crime ordinary people could commit, yet never abandoning the government as 
the prime mover in the dance of terror and consent.39 Other antebellum states followed this 
lead, though none included the nomenclature of ‘him or her’ to describe potential victims - 
New York in 1818, Rhode Island in 1822, then Massachusetts, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and 
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Virginia through the 1820s. In England, as a counterpoint, it was not until the Larceny Act 
1827 criminalized robbery as any ‘threat to accuse any person of any crime punishable by 
law with death, transportation, or pillory,’ a rule not as expansive as Americans would have 
it, but certainly more brutal, as the penalty was death.40 By opening up the ambit of 
extortionous threats, American legislatures infused the space between all citizens with the 
possibilities of debilitating terror. Such was the uses of extortion in a regime where citizens 
were responsible for ruling themselves 
 
The process of state legislatures clarifying and reorganizing the ambit of extortion might be 
seen as a democratizing movement - any person, under these laws, could summon the 
irresistible power of official terror to coerce victims without resorting to actual violence. 
Nevertheless, American legal conflicts over extortion included only men through the first half 
of the nineteenth century. There was no explicit provision in either statute or court decision 
concerning the gender of extortion. But, in a contest over consent, men’s privileged status 
did not have to be explicitly articulated. After all, almost all women found themselves 
circumscribed by the legal regime of coverture that ‘covered’ a woman under the existence 
of her husband; thus defined by law, a married woman had no legal status of her own, no 
property of her own, no legal voice of her own, a creature, one lawyer of the period insisted, 
of ‘no political relation to the state any more than an alien.’41 The situation might have been 
marginally more open for unmarried adult women who, as feme sole, could own property 
and make personal economic decisions, but nevertheless even they were explicitly excluded 
from the practices of political consent and were completely absent from policy-making 
circles.42 In a regime where being a man defined the very possibilities of liberation, men did 
not cry-out in terror from a woman’s secret threats. This is not to deny that, in real life, a 
woman could extract payments for keeping certain secrets. But no American man of the 
eighteenth century demanded state protection from an extortionous woman. 
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Perhaps the story of Maria Reynolds’ attempted extortion of Alexander Hamilton might shed 
some light on this gendered dynamic of terror and consent in the late eighteenth century. 
The story is rather involved, but it began in 1795 when James Callender accused the first 
Secretary of the Treasury of a ‘connection with one James Reynolds for purposes of 
improper pecuniary speculation’ designed to defraud the holders of Revolutionary War 
debts.43 It would be hard to conjure a more devastating allegation for the architect of the 
early American financial order, promising not just personal humiliation, but perpetual obloquy 
in the American patriotic catechism. Hamilton’s response: ‘My real crime,’ he volunteered 
against the advice of his friends, ‘is an amorous connection with [Reynolds’] wife for a 
considerable time with his privity and connivance, if not originally brought on by a 
combination between the husband and his wife with a design to extort money from me.’44 To 
counter the serious accusation of violating his fraternal trust, Hamilton offered the 
extortionous woman, a virtual alien to the circle of creditable and consenting men. And on 
this point he made it perfectly clear -‘the dread of the disclosure of an amorous connection,’ 
he wrote in 1797, making plain that she could not terrify him into submission, ‘was not a 
sufficient cause for my humility.’ Hamilton’s friends desperately tried to get him to reconsider 
his confession, and his enemies used it to harass Hamilton for the rest of his duel-shortened 
life. Yet, Hamilton calculated, the promise of absolution that would come from feminizing his 
wrongdoing was worth the risk of an embarrassing disclosure. Improper speculation meant 
not only the end of a career -it meant certain ignominy in the American patriotic catechism. 
Extortion at the hands of a woman, however, promised political redemption.  
 
In all of these examples of extortion, some celebrated, some forgotten, it was men who 
monopolized the extortionous use of fear. This is not just because of the lack of threatening 
women. Rather, the emphasis on consent and contract embedded the crime in definitively 
masculine terms, and even if some women were allowed to sign their own contracts, free 
exchange (and its negation through coercion) nevertheless unfolded in law and culture as a 
normatively male experience. There simply was no need for statutory or juridical exclusion of 
women from the extortionous exchange. To be sure, the possibility of an unmarried adult 
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woman, who as feme sole could sign contracts in her own name, remained open. This we 
shall take up a bit later. Nevertheless, the historical record remains perfectly consistent. No 
American law court, no theoretical treatise, no public appeal included women in the 
extortionous relationship. This is something that Hamilton surely knew. Otherwise his 
strange defence would have made no sense at all.   
 
3 The Emergence of the ‘Terrifying Woman’  
Perhaps it was the absence of women from the American legal culture of extortion that 
influenced the New York longshoreman John Zahn to allegedly send a number of letters 
threatening to accuse Caroline Reiser, if she did not pay $1000, of running a disorderly 
house. Because, even though he admitted sending the letters to his former sweetheart 
throughout the summer and fall of 1866, he did not seem to think that these threats to a 
woman were particularly extortionous. This was all a ‘private business relationship,’ he 
insisted, a facet of his long dealings with the Reiser family, and especially with her brother, 
Michael. Caroline Reiser was not at all the focus of the whole affair, it seemed, but rather 
was caught up in the whirlwind of a commercial exchange between legally competent men.45 
But she was the one injured, her attorney insisted, as Reiser experienced an emotional 
injury on her ‘nervous system’ that felt like a physical attack, ‘causing her constant 
excitement and sickness.’46 A trial ensued at the level of police court (the most local of the 
multi-layered system of precinct, city, and state courts that enforced law in New York City), 
and though it was not reported, newspaper accounts show that Zahn was jailed for a time.47 
Thus Caroline Reiser appears as the first women in an American extortion trial.  
 
If John Zahn hoped to use Caroline Reiser as a lens through which to sharpen focus on his 
financial relationship with Michael Reiser, as Alexander Hamilton saw in Maria Reynolds, he 
miscalculated. The legal and cultural landscape of class and gender in nineteenth century 
America, after all, had changed greatly in the six decades since Hamilton’s time. Much of 
this change, as historians have well-researched, was driven by the rising prominence of an 
ambitious and educated white-collar class in the modernizing nineteenth century. Struggling 
for relevance in a political landscape dominated by wealth and numbers, advocates of 
urbane respectability ‘advis[ed] retreat into a private and individualized world,’ celebrating ‘a 
cultural preference for domestic retirement and conjugal family intimacy’ that constituted a 
powerful claim for political relevance in the ‘heartless world’ of political machines and 
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predatory markets.48 Though some more recent critics have assailed these cultural 
ambitions as ‘a perpetual mothers’ day,’ this should not diminish the importance of 
domesticated women as both a machine of transformative intimacy and a badge of class 
membership.49 Women defined the possibilities of respectable manhood. For ‘with her,’ one 
early writer described women’s central place in this cultural universe, ‘man not only feels 
safe, but is actually renovated.’50 To the adherents of this more domesticated sort of 
manliness, women constituted the very measure of a self-consciously and aggressively 
respectable manhood. Women’s voices, to some men at least, could not be ignored. 
 
This celebration of the cultural power of certain women energized powerful and persistent 
movements to reshape the gendered order of republican institutional life. At perhaps the 
most basic level, the increasingly resonant voices of women echoed unprecedentedly within 
state legislatures, both as an image of class ethics, and as an echo of organized women’s 
political labours. In the framing of the famous ‘Maine Law’ of 1851 that prohibited the 
production and sale of liquor, and in the creation of Married Women’s Property Acts (the first 
of which was 1839), for example, women successfully lobbied legislatures with stories of 
alcohol and financially irresponsible husbands as offences against domesticated intimacy 
and against women’s place as the cornerstone of family life.51 Movements to grant married 
women the competence to sign contracts in their own name also gained momentum in 
legislatures.52 All of this signalled a profound shift in the legal structure of gendered power, 
organizing the foundation of married women’s legal existence as a consenting citizen and 
undermining the deep systems of coverture that sustained centuries of men’s near-monopoly 
on legal personhood.53 There was certainly more than a little paternalism on the part of male 
legislators and jurists when it came to protecting the honour of some women. Through the 
first half of the nineteenth century, for example, judges and state legislatures creatively 
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reformed the common law of slander, traditionally used to defend the reputations of 
reputable men, to protect appropriately ‘deserving’ women from untoward accusations of 
sexual ‘incontinence.’54 Nevertheless, the early institutionalization of women’s political voices 
signalled an important shift in the gendered structures of legal subjectivity in the American 
institutional order. Women, in their own names, were increasingly objects of law and 
subjects of consent.55 
 
So perhaps it should not surprise that, as domesticated women’s voices were finding 
institutional legitimacy, some men began to betray a deep anxiety about how this might 
affect their own ambitions of respectability. Historians have well documented the creation of 
men’s movements, like all-male ‘brotherhoods’ or the cult of Theodore Roosevelt’s 
‘strenuous life,’ that asserted an aggressive maleness for a class increasingly associated 
with domestication and domesticated women.56 But men could not completely exclude 
women from their lives -indeed, respectability just would not have it. One helpful Freemason, 
for example, was careful to instruct women of their enormous responsibility in this new world. 
‘A women should remember when she admits another to her friendship, how much she 
places in her power,’ he wrote in 1845. For the ‘mischief to society, and the individual misery 
occasioned by the viscous practice of retailing the faults of others, is incalculable in extent.’57 
The enormous power of women’s domestic knowledge was indispensible to the 
demonstration of class ‘respectability;’ yet the danger to men, if this power erupted unbound, 
was immense. No wonder others thought that it was men who should be warned of the 
                                                     
54
Andrew J King, ‘Constructing Gender: Sexual Slander in Nineteenth-Century America,’ Law and 
History Review 13 (Spring 1995), pp.63-110. 
55
There is of course a deeper political history of women in the republic, one where women appeared as a 
fundamental component of the larger society that government existed to represent. Two important 
personas in this line of reasoning were the ‘republican mother’ and ‘the republican wife,’ flourished in the 
early republic to describe the dynamic by which republican women contributed to the general good.  
Befitting this status, free American women were perhaps unprecedentedly likely to be schooled, and 
were never excluded from early systems of public education. See Linda Kerber, ‘The Republican Mother: 
Women and the Enlightenment-An American Perspective,’ American Quarterly 28 (1976), pp.187–205; 
Jan Lewis, ‘The Republican Wife: Virtue and Seduction in the Early Republic, William and Mary Quarterly 
44 (1987), pp.689-721; Jan Lewis, ‘Of Every Age, Sex, and Condition: The Representation of Women in 
the Constitution,’ Journal of the Early Republic 15 (1995) pp.359-387; Mary Kelley, Learning to Stand 
and Speak: Women, Education, and Public Life in America’s Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2008.) Nevertheless, women were exceedingly absent from more conventional political 
contexts, with the short-lived exception of propertied feme sole (women not under coverture, usually 
widows who had inherited estates) in New Jersey, who could vote in local elections  before 1807. 
Partisan attacks associating women’s voting with elite Federalist politics led to the abolition of this early 
gender-neutral regime of representation. Rosemarie Zagarri, Revolutionary Backlash, Women and 
Politics in the Early America Republic.(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 2008) 
56
 A few examples: Mark C. Carnes, Secret Ritual and Manhood in Victorian America (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991); Clifford Putney, Muscular Christianity: Manhood and Sports in 
Protestant America, 1880-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Kim Townsend, 
Manhood at Harvard: William James and Others (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996). 
57
American Masonic Review, May 1845. 
Law, Crime and History (2013) 
15 
 
dangers of domesticated regeneration, of those ‘women who enter private places, see all, 
know all, and give details celebrated and dangerous, precious and uncontainable expose 
with grave faces, to grave-looking men, as if they knew precisely what they were stating.’58 
In this way women were both intimate and alien to the ambitions of the self-consciously 
respectable, energizing with their transformative presence yet potentially destabilizing by 
placing in women’s hands the precious knowledge of men’s intimacies - a knowledge that 
could be wielded like a knife, as the eager young clerk Richard Robinson felt in the years 
before the Civil War: ‘Will you expose me to the world,’ he reportedly wrote to Helen Jewett 
right before he killed her, ‘will you cut my throat?’59 By the middle of the nineteenth century, it 
was becoming increasingly common to hear men telling the world just how terrified they 
were of women’s power.   
 
Perhaps, in this light, Emma Couch was not the first woman to actually try to extort a man, 
which allegedly she did in later 1871 with a threat to accuse the eminently respectable 
Abraham Beech Carter, rector of Manhattan’s Episcopal Holy Name Church, of criminal 
adultery. There is no telling how often women successfully, if secretly, blackmailed men 
before this drama. But it seems certain that no American man, even one completely innocent 
of any wrongdoing, used law to defend himself in such a situation.  This Carter did when he 
indignantly publicized his victimization in a letter to the paradigmatically respectable New 
York Times.60 Though scholars have suggested that the explosion of ‘sexual blackmail’ 
served to ‘police the boundaries of respectability’ and keep people within their prescribed 
social roles, commentators did not respond with indignation against Carter, or even with 
insults to Emma Couch.61 They responded, in a way that no men of earlier generations had 
done, with the fear and terror of a woman young, poor, and by all accounts, friendless. One 
theme that emerged in the uproar over Couch was that her extortion was indistinguishable 
from real violence, his mind subject to ‘excruciating pain,’ his soul and money alike ‘being 
bled’ to exhaustion.62 And, probably unknowingly reiterating much of the legal epistemology 
of extortion, more than one made the connection between a woman’s emotional terror and 
Carter’s own ‘self-possession and judgment.’63 To protect what more than one commentator 
referred to as Carter’s ‘manly self-possession,’ his advocates pleaded with Carter to press 
criminal charges against Couch, her terror, one state official insisted, ‘of the gravest concern 
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to the entire community.64 In early April the Grand Jury read the indictment, at 170 pages the 
longest on record up to that time, and passed a true bill.65 She pled guilty. By early spring 
she disappeared from the pages of the city’s newspapers and into the women’s house of 
detention. Her imprisonment was surely the first example of an American woman imprisoned 
for extortion in any American state.   
 
Emma Couch’s conviction was not the result of new law. It had been more than a half-
century since New York criminalized extortion by accusation of a crime. What had shifted 
was the cultural understanding of the extortionous injury. The supporters of Abraham Beech 
Carter, probably quite unconsciously, reiterated the lexicon of ‘constructive violence’ in a 
wholly unique context; it was a poor woman who inflicted pain, who bled a victim, who 
robbed a man’s ‘manly self-possession.’ Perhaps the story of Couch and Carter was not of 
paradigm-defining importance. But it was an opening shot to an unprecedented invasion of 
extortion stories that would spread through the 1870s and after. Looking back to 1872, the 
editors of the New York Times Index had to introduce a new heading of ‘Blackmail’ just to 
contain them all.66 
 
The widespread terror incited by Emma Couch may have been heightened by Carter’s 
sterling reputation. But it was not simply attacks on presumably good men that incited moral 
panic. Take, for example, the story of James Fisk, Jr., Erie Railroad magnate, architect of 
the famous ploy to corner the national gold market that culminated in the ‘Black Friday’ 
collapse of 1869, and generally considered a loud, brash, ostentatious, womanizing, tactless 
parvenu.67 Yet even with all this against Fisk, his former lover’s threats to expose their illicit 
(and Fisk’s adulterous) relationship nevertheless sent waves of fear throughout the 
community of respectable men. Unleashed in a series of ‘extraordinary letters’ published in 
the New York Herald (‘the most invading and sensationalist of the leading New York papers’ 
and a great enemy of the Republican Times) Fisk recoiled at the exposure of ‘some of the 
purest thoughts that ever stirred me.’ much more than the brash demands for $200,000 to 
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stop the leaks68 He protested loudly, telling anyone who would listen of Mansfield’s bad 
character; Mansfield filed a libel complaint in return, accusing him of publishing her letters in 
his defence (even though she, too, had numerous letters published, but none incriminating 
her of any wrongdoing.)69 Though he could have counter-sued Mansfield for Civil Libel, Fisk 
pressed criminal charges of extortion, perhaps suggesting a sophisticated understanding of 
the emerging landscape of sex and terror in the Gilded Age.70 Before the early January 1872 
sitting of the Grand Jury, however, Fisk was assassinated by Ned Stokes - a man 
simultaneously Fisk’s business partner, the namesake of his favourite pet parrot, and 
Mansfield’s intimate.71 What might have been a memorable extortion scheme, one would 
think, died with Fisk on the floor the Grand Central Hotel.  
 
The strange thing is, although no one fingered Josie Mansfield as an accomplice in Fisk’s 
murder, many contemporaries made their own folk-legal judgment on the guilt of a person 
whose very nature caused ‘civilization itself’ to tremble.72 By no means did all of this bile emit 
from the mouths of men; even correspondents in famous sex radical Victoria Woodhull’s 
eponymous journal recoiled from the destructive possibilities of Mansfield: ‘By her duplicity, 
treachery, and falsehood to her woman-nature, she has consigned one man to death and 
sent another on a direct way to the same fate.’73 But men could be especially forceful in 
proclaiming their judgment, as when a riot of Lowell, Massachusetts men ‘hooted and 
hustled’ Mansfield while she stood on the train platform, subjecting her to a public humiliation 
usually reserved for more ‘masculine’ threats to male political authority.74 Women depicted 
as violent and duplicitous extorters were sometimes, in the immediate aftermath this drama, 
called ‘Mansfields.’75 Even a half-century of time did nothing to wipe the imaginary blood off 
her ‘small white hands,’ a commentator in the 1920s making the folk-legal decision that 
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Mansfield was ‘the woman who was to cause Fisk’s death.’76 Her emotional terror was not 
merely metaphorical violence. It was, in the minds of her enemies, bloody, physically painful, 
and real. From this perspective, a woman’s threat to expose precious secrets of a secretive 
class was more than the symbolic ‘equivalent of actual violence.’ It constituted, in the cultural 
ambitions of the respectable, violence itself.  
 
Perhaps it is saying too much to suggest that the travails of Carter and Fisk, of Couch and 
Mansfield, sparked the unprecedented early-1870s explosion of what Angus McLaren calls 
‘heterosexual blackmail’ stories. They were, however, at the leading edge of a powerful 
cultural and legal movement, introducing the basic theoretical approaches and legal 
practices that would flower in the emerging age of sex scandal. True enough, it was not 
uncommon for respectable writers before 1870 to include women extorters as professional 
criminals in the class of ‘streetwalkers, stragglers on the pavement, loungers about hotels, 
keepers of dance-halls, panel thieves [who hide behind secret panels to steal from 
unsuspecting passers-by], and criminals of all grades.’ Yet increasingly commentators 
focused on what appeared as women’s naturally extortionous disposition.77 For some 
writers, the new realization of extortion’s fundamental femininity snuck up almost 
imperceptibly. The expositor James Dabney McCabe, famous for his accounts of the class 
contrasts of urban life, constantly shifted his view on the place of blackmailing women in 
each of his subsequent publications, going from the insistence in 1868 that blackmailing 
women were ‘sustained by a rough, or professional thief, or pickpocket’ to, by 1882, 
dropping men completely from the description of the blackmailer.78  Other writers were more 
explicit; ‘The female sex,’ wrote one journalist in the year of Couch and Mansfield, 
‘particularly excels at blackmail.’79 And though some were incredulous that this emerging 
fear was women’s doing, since ‘no woman is able to devise the legal frauds which are 
necessary to carry out a plan of black-mailing,’ it was far more usual for critics to describe 
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extortionous women as the very physical embodiment of the crime, ‘heartless and depraved,’ 
‘soulless,’ blood-stealing ‘vampires and pests of civilization.’80 Such creatures only had one 
purpose: for ‘Men are their victims,’ James McCabe warned, ‘and they rely upon their fears 
for success.’81 
 
As the terrifying woman emerged in the extortion stories of the 1870s, it is worth noting, a 
faint counter-discourse of extortion flashed into existence to challenge the cultural ethics of 
respectable men’s victimhood. Working-class journals, preeminent among them the National 
Police Gazette, reported in the 1870s a spate of stories concerning the extortionous 
exploitation of working women by men of higher class status, where voracious capitalists, 
devious divines, and perverted physicians wielded their power to extract even more surplus 
value from the purses and the psyches of a vulnerable female proletariat.82 Here women 
stood as place-holders in overlapping dramas of sex and class exploitation, their double 
weakness as women and as workers reinforcing their structural subordination at the hands 
of an insidious professional class. Such stories had no traction in the respectable press, 
however, and by the 1880s the Police Gazette focused almost exclusively on threats such as 
‘beautiful blackmailer[s]’ and ‘Pretty Mary Morton.’83 Even here, outside of the fearful 
mainstream, the terrifying women prevailed.  
 
4 Legal Developments and Reform 
Though the extensive media coverage of Emma Couch and Josie Mansfield suggests that 
ordinary readers were trying to make sense of women who seemed so unprecedentedly 
fearful, the underlying structures of law remained familiar. Both women were charged with 
extortion by threat of criminal accusation, and while earlier generations of male victims must 
not have thought such threats were so terrifying as to ask courts for protection, victims and 
their advocates found existing legal categories sufficient to the particular situations at hand. 
Still, existing law in different states had its limits when it came to protecting victims from the 
full array of coerced exchanges. In both Pennsylvania and Ohio, for example, juries had 
acquitted accused blackmailers because the content of their particular threats, though 
personally fearful, were nevertheless ‘not covered by law.’84 Yet increasingly after the 
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scandals of 1872, legal scholars and legislatures reassessed and reorganized the structures 
of the crime to more perfectly contain the fears of those who prized their domesticated 
secrecies. By the early 1880s states had not only vastly expanded the menu of threats 
considered legitimately extortionous, but had begun a process of undermining the common 
law calculus of fear and consent that made extortion such a haunting spectre in the 
republican imagination. 
 
Even before the terrific explosion of extortion-related anxieties in the 1870s, legal codifier 
David Dudley Field sensed that the available law just did not get to the point - not only in the 
particular law of extortion, which he did indeed consider, but in the principles of American 
law itself. Though largely forgotten today, Field served as the preeminent character in the 
nineteenth century American legal codification movement, a concerted effort to transform the 
‘chaos of centuries of laws, customs, judgments, and statutes’ that constituted the Common 
Law tradition, into ‘an intelligent, clear, and concise arrangement, a classification - a Code’85 
The code movement was more than a matter of tidying up. Inspired by a French Civil Law 
tradition that emerged from the revolutionary-era ardour for making the world anew, Field 
sought to sweep away the common law web of interacting and conflicting networks of rights 
and obligations to achieve what Jeremy Bentham insisted was the ‘the principal object of the 
[Civil] Laws: the care of security.’86 And, indeed, modern-day scholars have seen this 
emphasis on security as definitive of code traditions going back to the time of Justinian, 
showing a logic of rights without any hint of the privileged domain of participation that 
energized more ‘republican’ systems of political relations.87 Opponents to codification could 
hardly tolerate the wholesale dissolution of the ‘social standard of justice’ that underscored 
the common law preoccupation with regulating practical relations between legal subjects, as 
opposed to Civil Law’s focus on individuals as objects of regulatory power.88 But to codifiers, 
intent on identifying ‘objective and external standards’ that historian G. Edward White sees 
as a ‘morality directed at acts, not persons,’ this was the precisely the point.89 For the 
objective of modernizers was to reduce an infinite array of possible injuries to a set of 
universal principles organized for the efficient application of justice. 
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The New York Committee on the Code, created in 1848, presented the proposed Code of 
Penal Law in 1864. It was, again, not a restatement or a compilation or a revision. It was, 
instead, a law of the future, total, systematic, able to account for ‘the progress of society 
[that] creates new temptations and new opportunities to crime.’90The problem of extortion 
was one of the categories where this ‘progress’ erupted, and it received considerable 
attention. Where common law described extortion as a kind of relationship between subjects 
embedded in complex matrices of competing rights and obligations, the Code saw the crime 
in especially singular terms.91 ‘Fear,’ the Code begins a three-page delineation of the crime, 
‘constitute[s] extortion.’92 Of course many things could terrify - threats of violence, the 
codifiers listed, and threats to accuse of a crime. These dimensions of terror remained 
foundational. But the codifiers revealed the anxieties of the age; the provision’s fourth 
subsection installed a novel threat as sufficient to cause recognizable terror, a criminal act to 
even threaten ‘to expose any secret whatsoever’ in lieu of monetary payment. There was no 
paradigmatic secret whose exposure degraded men in the eyes of their fellows, nor was 
there a need to even feel oppressed. Secrecy itself, and not the things held secret, defined 
the principles of an ‘internal oppression.’ Fear was not a subjective state of mind, in this light, 
but an administrative protocol, its weight not in the effect on the victim’s capacity to act, but 
in the act of telling a victim’s secrets. The inclusion of telling another’s secrets in the menu of 
legally-recognized species of extortion  was thus something more than an expansion of 
official protection to recognize the basic values of a reticent, self-consciously ‘respectable’ 
manhood. It rewrote, in a way, the structures of republican manhood embedded in the 
calculations of fear and consent that animated the history of extortion.  
 
Undoubtedly the codifiers could have gone further. The contemporary state of the Civil Law 
in France forbid not only the publication of a person’s image without his or her consent, but 
prohibited the publication of any person’s name in matters other than of deep national 
interest.93 (In the U.S., conversely, courts would declare that the use of an actual child’s 
image for commercial purposes, without that person’s consent, was absolutely 
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permissible.)94 But for many others, things had already gone much too far. To writers like 
David Prentiss Bishop, the injuriousness of a mere ‘threat [that] is no more a physical force 
than is a lecture from a moralist’ appeared to lower the bar precipitously when it came to 
measuring the legal value of threats.95 Others, similarly, decried the reorientation of law 
around ‘merely sentimental injury.’96 And Thomas Cooley, among the most famous legal 
commentators of the time, pointed to the central irony of protecting secrecies, writing that ‘it 
is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than the citizen should be liable to have 
his premises…exposed to...prying curiosity.’97 The very idea of making ‘any secret 
whatsoever’ a basic object of government regulation seemed nothing if not ludicrous, not 
only a profound shift away from a common law preoccupation with measurable losses, but 
fundamentally contradictory in the effort to organize the absence of knowledge as a primary 
object of state regulation.   
 
Though the Penal Code would make a powerful impact on the American legal order in the 
late nineteenth century, it was not the only effort to reorganize extortion to meet the peculiar 
anxieties of respectable men. In some states, legislatures approached the novel problem of 
protecting men’s secrecies in a familiar language, using existing legal forms to describe in 
well-established ways the controversial substance of men’s secrecy. As early as 1849, the 
Virginia legislature imported principles of libel law to organize threatened ‘injury to the 
character’ of a man as an actionable threat.98 This example, however, probably had more to 
do with ongoing political discussions about duelling and the very hot topic of men’s 
reputations that unfolded generally in the US South and particularly in antebellum Virginia.99 
After the Civil War, however, other states would follow similar lines. Indiana, in 1873, 
expanded the menu of extortionous threats to include attempts ‘to accuse ... of any immoral 
conduct, which, if true, would tend to degrade and disgrace such person, with intent to 
extort.’100 New York followed in 1878 and Ohio in 1881.101 Victims certainly welcomed the 
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expansion of extortion injuries to include the simply disgraceful; courts summarily dismissed 
cases where plaintiffs were accused of humiliating, though not criminal, threats.102 Not too 
different from contemporary libel law, these efforts to criminalize threats to humiliate 
operated as sort of a pre-emptive strike for victims. Thus, drawing from the uncontroversial 
injury of libel, these statutes could account forthe unique losses of an anxious and upstart 
class, and do so in a language already understood by all state courts. These statutory efforts 
of the 1870s served as a middle ground, of sorts, a strategy for recognizing what appeared 
to be a newfound problem without discarding the existing systems of legal understanding.  
 
These state efforts illuminate the overlapping local responses to the political problem of lost 
domestic secrets. But it was, ultimately, the Field Code that realigned the legal landscape. 
New York finally adopted a modified Penal Code in 1881, and in the process superseded 
existing common law - not only on the subject of extortion, but on the entire body of criminal 
law. New York was not the first state to adopt the Code; California (whose Chief Judge 
Stephen J. Field, who would author the famous 1873 Slaughterhouse  dissent as Supreme 
Court justice, was David Dudley’s brother) had in fact been the first to adopt, in 1872, inciting 
a western rush to adopt the ready-made codes in Dakota and Montana Territories. By the 
early 1890s, even more states had adopted at least some parts of the Field Committee’s 
penal code: Ohio, Iowa, Texas, Wyoming, Nevada, and Utah,103 (Georgia and Louisiana had 
their own Civil Code traditions, but did not partake of the Field variety.) The Field Code’s 
definitions of extortion, furthermore, even insinuated themselves in pages of some of the 
more popular treatises on the criminal law that appeared in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, though there was among more established theorists a considerable 
prejudice against the legal innovations of the new age.104 By the end of the century, the Field 
Code, and the codified law of extortion, had spread to states throughout the United States.105 
 
5 Fear, Coercion and Consent  
The code provisions must have brought comfort to those New York men peculiarly fearful of 
losing control over their precious domestic secrets. After all, the reorganization of extortion 
around the cultural capital of men’s secrets did more than contain the potential of subversive 
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women to usurp the secrecies so central in reformist men’s self-consciousness as 
respectable, urbane, men. It freed fear from the common law’s complex calculations of 
consent and oppression that sustained a republican masculinity of political presence, and 
stabilized the experience of lost secrets (alone among extortionous assaults) as an injury in 
itself, independent of any degradation to person or property. Some blackmailers, however, 
saw new opportunities in this reconstructed legal landscape. For if fear was more than ever 
rooted in the theoretical foundation of the law, then threats that do not produce actual fear 
could still conceivably come short of the level of extortion. The thinking was rooted in the 
history of extortion, debating the conditions that produced irresistible fear. Several failed 
blackmailers of the time found promise in this clever argument. One of these creative 
criminals was a New York private investigator named Charles Gardner. His case would be 
familiar to readers of law reports over the coming century.   
 
Gardner was a one-time private investigator intimately familiar with the city’s legendary 
underworld of sex and vice. For 20 years before the 1890s, Gardner had been in the 
sometime employ of the ambitious reformer Charles Parkhurst, the ‘fearless missionary to 
the haunts of vice’ who was famous as the unusually articulate and learned pastor of the 
fading Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church.106 Along with their trusty sidekick Erving, 
Gardner and Parkhurst moved through the most notorious corners of the notorious city, 
exploring the vibrant ‘vernacular sexual culture’ of street-corner and saloon that both 
repelled and fascinated,  sitting at bars to proselytize among the wayward just as they 
associated with blackmailers like May Duigan to ferret-out crooked cops.107  Yet, in the 
spring of 1892, Gardner went alone. He was not on a mission of purification. The investigator 
was there to use his knowledge of the city’s sexual topography to extort sex-workers, 
demanding from his chosen victims the payment of cash to prevent his accusation of 
criminal conduct. The moralizer had become, in an instant, the marauder.   
 
One of Gardner’s targets was a newcomer to the city, Katie Amos, the ‘keeper of a 
disorderly house’ who had recently moved into Manhattan’s once-fashionable ‘Tenderloin 
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District’. His standard fee for silence was $50 a month. She accepted and, for a while, paid 
the erstwhile investigator. Then Gardner came down harder, tripling his monthly demands. 
Terrified and backed into a corner, Katie Amos went to the police where she met an old 
acquaintance, 22nd Precinct Captain William Devery. They plotted to trick Gardner. The plan 
was to pay the protection money with $150 in recorded bills to mark Gardner as the recipient 
of extorted money. Just to enhance the effect, Devery planned to hide in the closet and 
spring out just at the moment Amos handed over the cash. The scheme went off perfectly. 
Taken to the Precinct-house, Gardner was booked on the charge of extortion. Though the 
defence argued that there was no fear and thus no extortion, the city court sentenced 
Gardner to two years in prison for the attempted extortion of Katie Amos.108 ‘Gardner was 
then taken to the prisoner’s pen, where he found his wife just recovering from a swoon,’ the 
papers reported, unconsciously poetic. ‘He made a weak effort to comfort her and was then 
taken back to the Tombs.’109 
 
Gardner’s counsellor appealed on two grounds. The first one, procedural, focused on the 
propriety of ordering the defendant to rise to identify himself, which lawyers argued was a 
violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. But it was the 
substantive problem of the law that received the greatest attention; ‘His threats did not 
inspire fear inducing any action on the part of Mrs. Amos,’ the argument went, which 
‘renders it impossible to sustain a…conviction for the crime of an attempt at extortion.’ The 
argument was not spurious; the Code read, after all, that ‘fear…constitute[s] extortion.’ And if 
Amos was not put in fear, then there was no oppression, and if there was no oppression 
then there was no extortion. Gardner’s detractors sometimes recognized this legal point only 
to dismiss; ‘although there might have been a legal barrier against his conviction on the 
specific charge for which he was indicted,’ wrote one commentator, ‘yet his general 
character, as shown by the evidence, was such as to warrant the jurors in brushing aside 
this legal barrier and convicting him on his demerits.’110 The court, however, disagreed on 
this seeming technicality: ‘The crime of extortion is not committed unless the person parting 
with his money is induced to do so by wrongful use of force or fear.’111 There was no fear. 
Thus the crime was logically impossible to commit, no matter Gardner’s intent. Convinced by 
this ‘impossibility defence,’ the Appeal court vacated the original conviction and ordered 
Gardner released. Both history and law demanded that extortion was about real, substantive 
fear.  
                                                     
108
People v. Gardner, 25 N.Y. Suppl 1072 (1893); New York Times, 21 November 1892; Pittsburgh 
Gazette and Commercial Advertiser 14 February 1883. 
109
New York Times, 9 February 1893, p.1. 
110
New York Times, 10 February 1893, p.8. 
111
New York Times, 5 January 1894, p.1. 




At this point, however, the state Supreme Court intervened and invalidated the decision of 
the first Appeals court. Given the abruptness of intervention, one might suppose the panel of 
judges saw the liberation of Gardner as an injustice of a high order. Overturning an Appeals 
court’s ruling that found sufficient differences between the alleged act and the categories of 
the code to clear Gardner of wrongdoing, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that 
Gardner had in fact committed a crime. In order to demonstrate this conclusion, the opinion 
unfolded a complex web of similitudes in classic Common Law fashion, triangulating 
Gardner within a cosmology of earlier state decisions concerning frauds whose victims knew 
the truth, counterfeiters who exchanged fake bills with knowing merchants, and pickpockets 
who put their fingers into empty purses to deduce that it was not the effect on ‘the victim’s 
state of mind’ that defined the crime, but the intent - the ‘guilty mind,’ or ‘mens rea’ - of the 
criminal that mattered. With such reasoning it became clear that ‘The threat of the defendant 
was plainly an act done with intent to commit the crime of extortion, and it tended, but failed, 
to effect its commission, and, therefore, the act was plainly within the statute an attempt to 
commit the crime.’112 Gardner was again remanded to the care of the city’s jailers. The 
prisoner hung his hopes on the connection between the cultural emergence of women’s 
consent and the emerging regime of sexualized extortion. But he miscalculated. 
 
The case of Charles Gardner was not the only contemporary example of an alleged 
blackmailer claiming that the crime was impossible because the victim was not, for some 
reason or another, ‘put in fear.’ In California, in Nevada, and again in New York, defendants 
tried to convince juries and judges to pity them as the pawns of unscrupulous victims, led on 
and set up to commit a crime that had no chance of success.113 American state courts were 
never sympathetic, however. Gardner ran through the texts of these decisions and then 
some, unfolding as a ubiquitous presence not only in the cases of extortion, but in the so-
called ‘impossibility defence in general.114 Widely cited well into the later twentieth century, 
no court has deviated from Gardner’s conclusions.115 If the law of extortion was in constant 
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stress and flux for the better part of a century, Gardner’s efforts to terrify a woman out of her 
consent settled it. With a woman as plaintiff, courts realized that consent and fear no longer 
defined the crime.  
 
Conclusion 
Though extortion emerged as an almost paradigmatic crime for the emerging culture of 
spectacular intimacy, this legal and cultural consensus has its critics. The matter at issue, in 
large measure, is contract. To the important theorist Murray Rothbard, the criminalizing of 
extortionous contracts constituted a limit on contractor’s liberty. Rothbard writes: ’Blackmail 
would not be illegal in the free society. For blackmail is the exchange of money in exchange 
for the service of not publicizing certain information about the other person. No violence or 
threat of violence…is involved.’116 Looking at the extortionous exchange through the lens of 
what one might call ‘contractual formalism,’ the mere existence of an agreement defined the 
practical reality of consent - a line of reasoning, not coincidentally, at the heart of the early-
twentieth century American legal tradition of ‘freedom of contract,’ which courts used to 
invalidate some state protection of male workers as a violation of the free agreement 
between employer and employee,117 (the Court allowed regulation of women workers, 
however, given women’s seeming inability to be fully autonomous moral agents.)118 For 
Rothbard, thusly, the extortionous contract is no different from the employment contract, and 
for more than half a century, this line of analysis continues to influence critics of extortion 
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law.119 And here Rothbard’s analysis hits an historical impasse: the history of terror was so 
deeply embedded in the extortionous relationship that the very existence of extortion as a 
crime made the exchange of money for emotional security a fundamentally different species 
of agreement than the employment relation. Just as the formalism of the age structured the 
employment contract as the act of free will celebrated by libertarians like Rothbard, so it 
reflexively framed the extortionous contract as the opposite of consensual. The mere 
appearance of the form of an extortionous agreement constituted, on the face of it and apart 
from any larger context, an act of coercion. Ultimately, the libertarian critique of extortion law 
must be a critique of coercion and consent. But perhaps this is unavoidable. After all, the 
history of extortion is the history of probing the limits of free will - not the abstract free will of 
the formal contract, but free consent as experienced in its most intimate, most visceral 
reality. 
 
As much as the transformation of extortion law worked to accommodate the shifting cultural 
fears of self-consciously respectable men, those domestic fears were not quite quelled by 
the increasing power of states to guarantee the security of ‘any secret whatsoever.’ If 
anything, they flourished. Towards the end of the century, concern for control over domestic 
secrets circulated among social critics, legists, artists and even scientists, all concerned 
about the profound moral implications of autonomy in an increasingly interdependent and 
technologically advanced age.120 But perhaps the most famous, most concise, and most 
insightful contribution to this creative anxiety was Louis Brandeis’ famous 1890 article ‘The 
Right to Privacy.’ Written with his law partner Charles Warren, ‘The Right to Privacy’ 
reiterated many of the keywords of the extortion debates in order to critique the nature of 
legal protection itself, as it argued that the focus of law should not be the security of property 
or domicile or even bodily integrity. Rather, this landmark article insisted, law must ground 
itself in the subjective intimacy so prized by that respectable class, in the seemingly 
universal experience of those particular ‘thoughts, emotions, and sensations’ that flowered in 
‘the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.’121 As with extortion, it was terror that 
animated this project, the dread of a ‘mental pain and distress far greater than could be 
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inflicted by mere bodily injury.’ Yet Brandeis was interested in more than simply mitigating 
the terrors of domesticated men. He presented a manifesto for a modern republic where ‘the 
right to life has become the right to enjoy life,’ animating a century’s-worth of legal rethinking 
about the nature of citizenship and the substance of rights, and embedding itself in a post-
World War II jurisprudence where ‘the right to privacy’ (and not just a residual right of 
privacy) stands fully recognized in American law, if not in politics.122 In a way, then, extortion 
has served a double-function in American law and culture. It sums up the contests over the 
gendered nature of consent and coercion that constituted the epistemological subtext of the 
crime. But extortion also adumbrates, foreshadowing the anxieties, the terms of debate, and 
the theoretical reasoning of much privacy talk in the later-twentieth-century United States.123 
This movement to increase state enforcement of emotional security was inevitable, Brandeis 
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